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Foreiqn Exchange Market Intervention
a Survey of the Empirical Literature
Geert J. Almekinders
and
Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger "'
1. INTRODUCTION
Disagreement can be observed in the literature as to
whether there remains a need for central bank intervention
in the case of a freely floating exchange rate system.
According to Wallace (1979) demands for different curren-
cies are mostly determined by speculation. In the absence
of legal restrictions on (international) asset holdings
(anticipated) official intervention should stabilize the
exchange rates. Mayer (1982), on the contrary, contends
that intervention in markets for foreign exchange can be
left undone on the implicit assumption that demands for
individual currencies are well behaved. A stable economic
environment thus guarantees stable exchange rates. Further-
more, Krugman (1988) states that a target zone for exchange
rates is only sustainable for a finite amount of time.
Repeated intervention by central banks will result in a
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loss of reserves which is large enough to trigger off a
speculative attack at one moment.
This controversy is not at the heart of this article.
We treat the functioning of the current exchange rate
system as a fact and assume that discontent at its outcomes
by destabilizing speculation in the foreign exchange market
has caused the marked increase in the volume of central
bank intervention since the mid 1980s.
In what follows we will briefly discuss the definition
of exchange market intervention and the different kinds of
intervention that are being discerned. Furthermore, we will
summarize the objectives a central bank may pursue by car-
rying out exchange market intervention and the channels
through which intervention can influence the development of
the exchange rates. Finally, we will give a survey of the
results of empirical research that has been carried out to
assess which objectives the central bank did in fact pursue
and whether the interventions were effective after all.
2.DEFINITION
We define an exchange market intervention as a sale or
a purchase of foreign currencies by the monetary authori-
ties with the aim of changing the exchange rate of their
own currency vis-à-vis one or more foreign currencies. The
distinction that is often being made between "active
intervention" on the one hand and "passive intervention" on
the other hand does not seem very helpful to us when
empirical research is concerned. By definition passive
intervention distinguishes from active intervention in that
the transactions are carried out outside instead of inside
the exchange market. It is of course at the discretion of
a central bank to carry out a sale of foreign exchange
inside or outside the market depending on the strength of
its own currency.
For example, the buying of troop dollars and the
steady inflow of interest earnings on its dollar reserves
cause the Bundesbank's international reserves to increase
autonomously. The Bundesbank has stabilized its reserve
position by selling foreign currencies inside the market in
periods when the DM was weak and outside the market in
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periods when the DM was strong against the U.S. dollar. By
counteracting the autonomous growth in reserves in this way
the Bundesbank ceteris paribus supports the level of the
DM-dollar exchange rate.
The empirical investigation of objectives and effecti-
veness of exchange market intervention is hampered by a
lack of data with respect to this division. Most research-
ers try to concentrate on data series covering transactions
in foreign currencies which have been undertaken with the
sole aim of influencing the development of the exchange
rate.
3. DIFFERENT KINDS OF INTERVENTION
By far the larger part of exchange market intervention
is being carried out in the spot market. While "analytical-
ly there is no distinction between the effects of forward
market and sterilized spot market transactions on the spot
exchange rate" [Smith d~ Madigan (1988, p. 189)) the reason
for this seems to lie in the fact that an intervention
operation derives a great deal of its effect from the an-
nouncement of the operation itself. Highly visible spot
market operations confirm the announcement.
A purchase (sale) of foreign exchange by a central
bank ceteris paribus leads to an increase (decrease) in the
reserve position of the private banking system as a whole
(unsterilized foreign exchange market intervention). To
prevent the money stock from increasing the monetary autho-
rities can sterilize the effect of the exchange market
intervention by selling (buying) short term domestic assets
to (from) the banking system leaving the monetary base of
the country unchanged. The monetary base (MB) consists of
currency in the hands of the public and reserves in the
banking system. By definition it equals the sum of net
foreign assets (NFA) and domestic assets (DA) in the hands
of the central bank:
MB - NFA t DA (1)
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The effect of the exchange market intervention on the mone-
tary base is completely neutralized when:
~DA - -~NFA (2)
A central bank can publicly announce to defend a cer-
tain level of its own currency in terms of a third curren-
cy. This intervention method is productive when it gains
the exchange market participants' confidence and speculati-
on against the currency is stopped. If, on the contrary,
speculators view the particular exchange rate level that
the cental bank is willing to defend as too high, seemingly
infinite speculative capital flows will force the central
bank to review its policy. To prevent this counterproducti-
vity from happening a central bank can intervene in the
market for foreign exchange anonymously. It can instruct a
private bank to buy or sell a certain amount of foreign
exchange when a particular exchange rate level is reached.
Of course, depending on the signal the central bank wants
to give, it may instruct more than one bank and or currency
broker.
Furthermore a distinction can be made between inter-
vention carried out within the domestic exchange market and
intervention undertaken at times when the domestic market
for foreign exchange is closed. The latter sort of inter-
vention can take two forms which at the end work out the
same. First, a cental bank can contact a private bank which
is, outside market times, faced with an excess demand - or
supply of a certain currency. Given the current state of
information technology the private bank will otherwise
enter the world market for foreign exchange in the time
zone where it is open at that particular moment. The second
form of this sort of intervention applies here. The central
bank can instruct an other central bank situated in that
time zone to carry out a certain transaction in the market
for foreign exchange to counteract unwanted exchange rate
movements.
In an attempt to stabilize the spot exchange rate, the
central bank could enter the foreign exchange options mar-
ket. A depreciation of the domestic currency can in princi-
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ple be stopped when agents that had planned to sell amounts
of the currency buy put-options that have been written by
the central bank, instead. The pressure on the exchange
rate is however not lessened when options are only bought
by options-traders. Furthermore, whereas currency specula-
tors are faced with a two-sided exchange rate risk, the
options-traders' risk is only one way. Finally, the in-
fluence of the options-market on the underlying spot and
forward market is still not clear.
4 OBJECTIVES OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTIONS; THEORY
In the theoretical literature two divisions of objec-
tives can be found. In the Jurgensen-report (1983) the
objectives are classified by the term on which they are
pursued by the central bank. Whereas the kind of objectives
which lie behind the intervention forms the division-
criterion for German economists like Lehment (1980) and
Sommer ( 1983). The latter division-criterion distinguishes
four categories of interventions. "Anpassungs"-interven-
tions grosso modo correspond with interventions undertaken
on account of a leaning against the wind policy. The
central bank tries to resist large short term exchange rate
movements without affecting the underlying trend. Interven-
tions carried out to alter the trend in the development of
the exchange rate for economic or political reasons are
called "Erhaltungs"-interventions. Whereas "Gestaltungs"-
interventions apply to the situation where the exchange
rate is moving out of control. Finally, the category "other
interventions" covers sales and purchases of foreign
currencies aimed at the management of the volume and
composition of the foreign exchange market reserves of the
central bank.
The extent of the division of objectives in the
Jurgensen-report is in our view not in accordance with what
the central banks try to do to counteract unwanted exchange
rate movements. To formulate medium term and long term
objectives is one thing. To carry out exchange market
interventions aimed at realizing those objectives while one
is even not able to control the exchange rate movements in
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the short run is something totally different.
An intervention reaction function can be derived by
combining a policy loss function with a set of equations
describing the determination of the exchange rate of
currency B in terms of currency A(S,). The policy loss
function reflects the hypothesis that the central bank of
country A wishes to limit deviations from a target level
for the exchange rate (S,'):
L, - (log S, - log S,`)' - ( s, -s,')' (3)
with s, - log S, and s,' - log S,' . To capture intervention
carried out on account of a leaning against the wind
policy, the target level for the exchange rate can be
thought of as representing past levels of the exchange
rate. The determination of the exchange rate can be modell-
ed by implementing a simplified flow market interpretation
as in Neumann ( 1984). The market for currency A is in
equilibrium when the net supply of currency A by the
central bank of country A(I,') equals the change in the net
stock demand for assets denominated in currency A by
residents of country B(~AA,') plus the net flow demand for
currency A resultinq from current account transactions
( ~~ ) :
I,' - .AA,' fCA,
whereby
Ap4' -( t~cv ,)( s, - E, s,., f i,' - i,
(4)
.
In equation (6), c represents the coefficient of relative
risk aversion (c~0), V, the variance of unanticipated
changes in the exchange rate (V,~O), E, is the expectation
operator conditional on information at time t, i,' and i,'
are the one-period interest rate in country A and B
respectively. The current account surplus is assumed to
depend on lagged values of the real exchange rate. In this
context it needs no further specification.
By minimizing the loss function (3) with respect to
the constraints given by the equations (4) and (5) and by
making use of the definition for the expected risk premium
FIGURE 1. Three chamels of influence of official intervention
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3 portfolio balance channel
on assets denominated in currency A, RP,"
RP," - f, - E,s,., (6)
in which f, denotes the log of the one-period forward rate
(F,), and of the interest arbitrage condition:
i," -i,' - f, - s, ( 7 )
the intervention reaction function can be obtained:
I," - ( ~~w , ) ( 'RP" - s t s` ) , f CA, (8)
It appears that the central bank of country A will supply
amounts of currency A to the foreign exchange market
(I,'~0) when the exchange rate of currency B in terms of
currency A is lower than the target value (s,~s,'), when an
increase in the expected risk premium on assets denominated
in currency A raises speculative demand for that currency
(.RP,"~0) and when there is a current account surplus for
country A (CA,~O).
5 EFFECTIVENESS OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTION; THEORY
Following the approach taken by Loopesko (1984) and
Humpage (1986) a number of channels can be distinguished
through which the exchange rate can be influenced. Figure
1 gives a representation of the three main channels.
Figure 1
Non-sterilized purchases and sales of foreign exchange
are said to have an impact on the exchange rate via the
monetary channel. A purchase of foreign currency by the
central bank for example leads to a loosening of the domes-
tic money market and ceteris paribus results in an increase
in the money stock. In most economic models a depreciation
of the currency is the immediate consequence.
In the monetarist exchange rate model the money demand
functions of countries A and B are the basic components.
Here they are assumed identical:
8
- p, t~, 1( r, -~, . i, (9)
The relative change in the demand for money (Mo,) is a func-
tion of the relative chanqe in the price level (~,) and the
production level (1tr,), and the absolute change in the in-
terest rate (.i,). With the production level determined
exogenously, perfect capital mobility, rational expectati-
ons and when it is assumed that purchasing power parity
holds for tradeables, the long term solution for the
monetarist exchange rate model runs as follows:
S, - (Mo, - Mo,), - ~, (Yr, - Yr,), (10)
An increase in the money supply in country A leads to a
proportional depreciation of currency A with respect to
currency E3.
Fairly all empirical investigations disregard the
monetary channel because it can be argued that this channel
applies to monetary policy instead of exchange rate
policy. Of course, this argument may be rather arbitrary.
Sterilized purchases and sales of foreign exchange can
have an impact on the exchange rate in theory. Loopesko
distinguishes three possible channels. In the portfolio-
balance model it is assumed that risk-averse wealth holders
diversify their portfolios across assets denominated in
different currencies. When wealth holders do not view
otherwise identical government bonds denominated in curren-
cy A and currency B as perfect substitutes, a disturbance
of the portfolio-balance caused by a sterilized exchange
market intervention carried out by the central bank of
country A will ceteris paribus lead to a change in the spot
exchange rate ( S, ) of currency B in terms of currency A.
The level of the risk premium on government bonds denomina-
ted in currency B(RP,') can be definied as:
RP,' - ( i. - l. ) , - ( S, - E, S,., ) ( 11)
Now suppose that the central bank of country A buys an
amount of currency B to support the latter currency,
whereby an offsetting sale of short term government bonds
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denominated in currency A leaves the money stock in country
A unchanged. The open market sale induces a rise in i, and,
in order to rebalance their portfolios, an excess demand of
foreign securities by the investors. A depreciation of
currency A in terms of currency B restores portfolio-
balance by lowering the risk premium on government bonds
denominated in currency B[see equation (11)], and increas-
ing the value of government bonds denominated in currency
B in terms of currency A.
Beside the portfolio-balance channel two other chan-
nels are being distinguished by which sterilized interven-
tions can affect the exchange rate. The market-efficiency
channel implies that the central bank can "[focus] the
attention of the public on neglected information that is
germane to exchange rate determination" [Loopesko (1984, p.
258)]. It must be noted that in our opinion it is very hard
for the central bankers to establish the market inefficien-
cies with certainty. The superior-information channel
corresponds with what we call the expectations channel. By
providing the market with new information or a signal about
the future course of the exchange rate or of monetary
policy, the exchange rate can be expected to change immedi-
ately after the intervention. Notably, supporters of the
asset market view of exchange rates see this as the main
channel through which interventions can affect the exchange
rate.
6. OBJECTIVES OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTION:
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
In this part we will give an overview of the results
of empirical research that has been undertaken since the
transition, in 1973, to a system of freely floating exchan-
ge rates. From the estimated reaction functions it can be
judged which of the objectives that can be distinguished in
theory were in fact pursued.
The dramatic increase of the exchange market turnovers
has caused a proper timing of the interventions and the use
of the correct intervention technique to become of growing
importance in the exchange rate policy of the central
banks. The estimated reaction functions however only give
TABLE 1
estimation definition of interveníng
period dato technique intervention exchenge rate central
bank
Artus March '73 - July '75 monthly 25LS change in the net spot rete of the(1976) foreign assets of the Deutsche Mark in DBBBurxiesbenk (in billions [erms of US dollsrs
of D Merk)(p. 319)
Ouirk Narch '73 - Oc[.'76 monthly OLS changes in the spot rate of [he yen(1977) 8 foreign Exchenge Fund in [erms of U.S. BOJ
25L5 account (in millions of dollers
- - - - -- - - -- - -- - -
dol(ars) (p-650)
Branson et.al Aug.'71 - Dec.'T6 monthly 25L5
-- - -
Internationel reserves
- -- -- -spot rate of the
- --
(1977) of Germeny (in U.S. Deu[sche Mark in
dollars) minus terms of U.S. dollars D88eranson et.al Aug-'71 - March '78 cumulated SOR elloca- index 1970 - 100(1979) tions (P.323)
Dornbusch July '73 - Dec-'79 quarterly OLS changes in reserves 1)effec[ive spot rate DBB,BOJ,(1980) (except for interest of the U.S. dollar Bank of
earnings as a fraction 2)spot rate of the Cenada,
of lagged reserves DM in terms of U.S. Benque de
(p. 713) dollars France
3)spot rate of the and Bank
yen in terms of of
U.S. dollars England
Lehment April '73 - Dec.'78 monthly OLS average month(y changes change in the spot(1980) of the adjusted net rate of the D.N. in DBB
reserve position of terms of U.S. dollars
the Burxiesbenk (p. 220)
Konig 8 Gaab April '73 - Jan.'82 monthly OLS changes in the stock of change in the spo[
(1982) foreign exchange rate of the U.S. DBB
reserves in billions dollar in terms of
of D.M. (p.190) D.M.
Neumann March '74 - Dec.'81 monthly OLS Burxiesbank's direct (log of the) spot
C1984) transactions in the rate of the D.M. in
U.S. dollar~D.M. market U.S- dollars DBB
(P.237)
Eijffinger 8 Feb.'85 - Sept.'88 daily OLS "active" intervention spot rate of the D88
Gruijters inside the U.S. dollar~ U.S. dollar ín terms 8(1989 a) DM exchange market (p.2) of D.M. FED
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an explanation for the volume and direction of intervention
transactions. This, of course, detracts from the explanato-
ry power of the estimated relations. All investigations
under review are concerned with spot market interventions
only. In the estimated reaction functions the volume of
intervention in subsequent periods (I,) is the dependent
variable that has to be explained by the independent
variables of which the difference between the actual level
of the exchange rate (S,) and the target level of the
exchange rate (S,') is the most important one. Obviously
when the estimation is carried out using monthly data the
exchange rate change in one month (independent variable)
will be simultaneously determined by the interventions
undertaken in the same month. In an attempt to reduce the
simultaneity bias some studies use the two stages least
squares (2SLS) estimation technique. Nevertheless, the
estimation results have to be interpreted carefully.
Henceforth we will discuss a number of empirical
investigations into the objectives of exchange market
intervention. Their main characteristics are summarized in
table 1.
TABLE 1
Artus (1976) studies the intervention policy of the
Bundesbank (DBB) over the period March 1973-July 1975. He
finds evidence of a leaning against the wind policy. A rise
(fall) by one percentage point in the value of the DM in
terms of the U.S. dollar (S,) during one month gave rise to
the buying (selling) of 0.359 billion DM worth of foreign
exchange over the same one-month period. Furthermore the
German central bank on average bought (sold) 463 million DM
of foreign exchange "for each U.S.~ 0.01 of discrepancy
between the current value of the deutsche mark in U.S.
cents", (S,), "and its target value", (S,') (p. 329). The
target level of the exchange rate is based on relative
prices in the Federal Republic of Germany (P~) and the
United States (P,~). The structural equations with standard
errors in brackets look as follows:
~ NFA - 0.463 ( S, - S,~ ) t 0.359 S,f~~., (12)
[0.093] [0.057]
11
S,' - 40.2 - 54.8 (P, ~P,~ -1)
The findings of Quirk (1977) with respect to the in-
tervention behaviour by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) show a
qreat deal of correspondence with those of Artus' study of
the German intervention policy. Quirk however is not able
to relate the interventions to the deviation from a target
level for the yen exchange rate. Instead, the total volume
of spot transactions on the Tokyo foreiqn exchange market
and the laqged endogenous variable are significant indepen-
dent variables in explaining the intervention response. A
one percent exchange rate change of the yen with regard to
the U.S. dollar was accompanied on average by intervention
amounting to ~ 156 million in the month the exchange rate
change occurred and S 78 million thereafter. Quirk ascer-
tained that the interpretation of the OLS-estimates was not
hampered by a simultaneity-bias after comparing the results
with those of a 2 SLS-estimate.
Branson, Halttunen k Masson (1977, 1979) try to apply
the asset-market model empirically to the U.S. dollar - DM
exchanqe rate. To obtain consistent results a reaction
tunction Cor intervention is estimated simultaneously.
Branson, Halttunen 6 Masson relate Germany's reserve
position in period t to the reserve position in period t-1
and the change in the index of the U.S. dollar~DM exchange
rate that occurred betweer the end of period t-1 and the
end of period t. A rise (fall) of the S~DM-exchange rate
index by one point caused the Bundesbank to lean against
the wind by means of purchasing (selling) S 83 million when
estimated over the period 1971:8-1976:12, and S 180 million
when estimated over the period 1971:8-1978:3.
Dornbusch (1980) assumes that central banks calculate
the unanticipated depreciation of the U.S. dollar (S,W),
defined as the difference between the actual depreciation
of the U.S. dollar with respect to their own currencies (S,)
and the depreciation that investors had already anticipated
upon by demanding a risk premium on assets denominated in
U.S. dollars:
S, W - ~, - ( i, ~ - i, ~ ) (14 )
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The intervention behaviour of the major industrial coun-
tries taken as a whole (I,) is explained rather poorly by
the unanticipated depreciation of the effective exchange
rate of the U.S. dollar, indicating perhaps that one or
more important explanatory variables have been left out of
the estimated reaction function. The main result of the
estimations is, with t-values in parentheses:
1~ - 1.00 1 0.003 5~,~ 1 0.001 S, ~"
(104.8) (3.22} (1.68)
R,-0.38 DW-1.81 SEE-0.05
For example, an unanticipated depreciation of the nominal
effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar during a quarter
by one percentage point,led to a cumulative intervention of
0.4 percent of foreign net claims on the United States ( in
1980: ~600 million).
Lehment (1980) distinguishes two estimation periods.
For the first period, April 1971-December 1975, the results
show a significant proportional relationship between
changes in the exchange rate of the DM in terms of U.S.
dollars and changes in the reserve position of the Bundes-
bank. For the period January 1976-December 1975, there are
no signs of a leaning against the wind policy. Lehment
supposes that this is caused by the fact that the Bundes-
bank aimed its interventions at keeping the S~DM exchange
rate within a certain target zone. He does however not test
this presumption.
The explanatory power of the reaction functions
estimated in Kónig á Gaab (1982) over the period April
1973-July 1975 is satisfactory. The estimation results
furthermore correspond for the greater part with those of
the studies discussed above. However, estimates over later
periods (1974-1979, 1980-1981) lose power dramatically.
Neumann (1984) takes up the challenge of trying to
formulate and estimate an intervention reaction model which
explains a considerable portion of observed Bundesbank
intervention. Unlike Kónig 6 Gaab (1982), Neumann (1984)
has data at his disposition which give a precise coverage
of the foreign exchange operations undertaken with the sole
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aim of influencinq the exchange rate. Furthermore, Neumann
estimates a non-linear model in which he tries to establish
whether or not the Bundesbank shifts its priority to
controlling the money stock when the uncertainty in the
DM~U.S. dollar market increases. Neumann supposes that the
Bundesbank buys U.S. dollars when the spot rate of the DM
in terms of U.S. dollars goes beyond the target level and
in case of an increase in the expected risk premium [see
equation (11)) on DM-assets. The target level-specification
giving the reaction function the highest explanatory power
looks as follows :
log S,' - ë log F,, f(1-ó) log S,~ t. RPt f~, (16)
As in Artus (1976), purchasing power parity considerations
(S,~ ) are taken into account. This of course comes down to
stabilizing the real exchange rate. In an attempt to fight
private speculation ex ante the Bundesbank tries to com-
press the risk premium. This is done by revising the target
rate in accordance with increases in the expected risk
premium and movements in the lagged forward rate (F,-,). It
appeares that for the more turbulent subperiod, September
1977-December 1981, Neumann's supposition of a shift in the
trade-off in favor of money control is confirmed.
Eijffinger á~ Gruijters (1989a) have daily data of
intervention by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System at their disposal. This makes possible the testing
of a second intervention strategy . countering erratic
fluctuations and leaning against the wind over shorter
periods than one month. To take account of exchange rate
movements which take place during a day, Eijffinger á~
Gruijters include in their estimation the opening-, fixing-
, and closing rates of every trading day at the Frankfurt
foreign exchanqe market. These variables are indicated by
S,', S,' and S,~ respectively. It appears that on average one
fifth of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions
taken as a whole were directed at minimizing the difference
between the spot rate and the five days moving average of
the opening, fixing and closing rate of the U.S. dollar in
terms of DM. For September 1985 estimation results indicate
that the Bundesbank pursued a leaning with the wind policy.
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Probably all observed U.S. dollar sales were carried out
after the establishment of the Plaza agreement had shifted
the market sentiment in favor of a depreciation of the U.S.
dollar. The coordination of exchange market intervention by
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System is inves-
tigated by adding intervention by the Federal Reserve as an
extra explanatory variable of the Bundesbank's reaction
function.The estimated coordination coefficient is sig-
nificantly different from zero in five out of eight months
in which both central banks intervened. However its value
is unstable indicating a divergent degree of coordination.
To test the effect of exchange market uncertainty on
interventions the smoothing coefficient is adjusted for the
variance of the opening, fixing and closing rates of the
U.S. dollar in terms of the DM in the past five days. The
estimation results for the reaction function of the Bundes-
bank's interventions (I,"") in October 1987 are as follows,
with t-values in parentheses
s
I"' --0. 003 - 1321 . 7 a,' [ S,~ -tits E 5,.~ "'N J
(-0.10) (- 5.47) n-1
5 5




Eijffinger ~ Gruijters find that in months with large
exchange rate fluctuations the smoothing coefficient as
well as the explanatory power of the reaction function are
larger than otherwise. This indicates that the Bundesbank
and the Federal Reserve System take their responsibility
and do not pull back when the uncertainty grows, contrary
to the empirical findings of Neumann (1984).
7. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXCHANGE MARKET INTERVENTION:
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
In this part we will summarize the results of empiri-
cal research carried out to ascertaín the effectiveness of
foreign exchange market intervention undertaken since 1973.
As noted earlier, the effectiveness of non-sterilized
TABLE 2
intervening
estimation definition of central
period data technique interven[ion exchange rate benk
portfolio balance channel
Branson et.al Aug.'71 - Dec.'76 monthly 2 SLS internatíonal reserves spot rete of the
(1977) of Germany Deutsche Mark in
(in U.S. dollars) U.S. dollars terms, DBB
Branson e[.al Aug.'71 - March '78 mirws cumula[ed SDR index 1970 -100
(1979) allocations (p.323)
Loopesko May '75 - Nov.'81 daily OLS interventions of the log of the spot rate Central
(1984) individual G-7 coun[ries of the G-7 currencies banks of
(in millions of U.S. in terms of the the G-7
dollars), more precise U.S. dollar countries
definition unknown(p-270
Rogoff March '73 - Dec.'80 weekly 25 2SLS changes in the Canadian log of the spot rete Bank
(1984) Exchange Fund account, of the U.S. dollar of




portfolio balance - and expectations channeL
Dominguez 8 Nov.'82 - Dec.'87 daily IV Bundesbank interventions log of the spot rate 086
Frankel 'active interventions' of the Deutsche Mark FED
(1989) aimed at influencing the in terms of the Treasury







Humpagc Aug.'84 - Aug.'87 dunmies with OLS "Intervention dunmies -log of the spot rate
(1988) value one on ere construc[ed from of the U.S.doller FED
days the Fed in[ernel docunen[s on in terms of DM
intervened U.S. intervention"(p. 4) -log of the spot rate
and with of the U.S. dollar




Eijffinger 8 Feb.'85 - Aug.'88 daily OLS active intervention spot rate of the DBB
Gruijters inside the U.S. dollar~ U.S. dollar in terms
(1989 b) DM market aimed at of DM 8
influencing the spot
rate of the U.S. dollar FED
in DM (in billions ofDM)
(P- 2)
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interventions has not been investigated empirically.
Attention has been paid to the effectiveness of interventi-
ons via the portfolio balance channel because this channel,
if operative, constitutes an independent tool of monetary
policy. The enormous growth in financial market turnovers
during the last decade has diminished the potential for
central banks to cause a significant imbalance in wealth
holders' portfolios. For this reason current research
focusses more on the expectations channel.
As we argued in the theoretical discussion the portfo-
lio balance channel can only be effective if the risk pre-
mium (RP,) in equation (11) does not equal zero. Problems
arise however when one wants to calculate the risk premium.
Various attempts have been made using different kinds of
expectations formations. Another complication lies in the
fact that the effect of central bank interventions is
absorbed in the movements of the exchange rate immediately.
To get a clear view of the actual effectiveness one should
be able to compare these movements with the fluctuations in
the exchange rate that would have occurred in the absence
of intervention.
The main characteristics of the empirical studies we
will discuss below are summarized in table 2.
Table 2
In Branson, Halttunen S Masson (1977, 1979) movements
in the spot rate of the Deutsche Mark in terms of U.S.
dollars (S,) are related to movements in U.S. and German
stocks of money (M1,~ , M1,`) and net foreign assets (FP,~ ,
FP,". Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions have
an impact on the volume of a country's net foreign assets,
but leave the money stock unchanged. Thus, it is possible
to detect the effect of such interventions without having
the problem of finding a proxy for the expected exchange
rate movements. Consístent estimates look as follows, with
t-values in parentheses:
S,- -4.852 -0.062 M1,` f0.092 M1,~ t0.676 FP,` -0.398 FP,~ (19)
(-0.1) (-1.7) (2.8) (1.7) (-1.9)
R~ - 0.937 DW - 1.349 RHO - 0.868(14.0)
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All coefficients have the correct sign.From a point es-
timate in Branson et. al. (1977) it can be derived that a
sterilized purchase by the Bundesbank of ~ 1 billion on
average caused the DM to depreciate by 0.185 cent. Compa-
ring Branson et. al. (1977) with Branson et. al. (1979)
however, leads one to conclude that the results are unsta-
ble.
Loopesko (1984) creates a series for realized foreign
exchange market profits, r,:
r~ - í i, ~ - i,' ) - ( S,. ~ - S,-: ) ( 2 0 )
S is the logarithm of the spot rate of a G-7 currency in
terms of the U.S. dollar, i~ and i' are overnight U.S.
dollar and G-7 currency Eurodeposit rates, respectively.
Realized profits calculated this way reflect both the
expected risk premium and any spot rate forecast error. The
joint hypothesis of perfect substitutability of assets
denominated in different currencies and of the 'efficient'
working of the foreign exchange market is rejected because
previously observable vaiables (e.g. cumulated interventi-
ons, lagged values of realized profits and the exchange
rate) proved to be significant determinants of realized
profits. The results of a second (F-)test lead Loopesko to
conclude that "...the predictable component of realized
profits can be identified with a risk premium, and hence
that sterilized intervention can affect the exchange rate
through a portfolio balance channel"(p. 267). However,
interventions are only one out of many factors that deter-
mine demand and supply conditions on the foreign exchange
market and therefore changes in the risk premium. Loopes-
ko's investigation of the 'extra effectiveness' of coordi-
nated interventions is hindered by a lack of data as well
as difficulties in interpreting the data. She finds some
evidence of a more than proportionate effect of coordinated
U.S. and narrowly defined German intervention.
Rogoff (1984) expects the risk premium on assets deno-
minated in Canadian dollars to be positively correlated
with the relative supply of Canadian dollar (A,) versus U.S.
dollar (A,') denominated outside assets, both including the
monetary base:
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( i,`" -i," -.s,` ) - czo f a, (A.~S~~~ ) t F~,
He supposes that expectations are formed rationally. This
enables him to replace the expected exchange rate change by
the ex post exchange rate change:
5.., - 5,., ' t A,., (22)
where 6,., is a forecasting error which is uncorrelated with
any information dated period t or earlier. The very disap-
pointing estimation results are accompanied by the "plausi-
ble interpretation (...) that there is a time-varying
exchange risk premium but one that cannot be affected by
sterilized intervention" (p.141).
The goal of Dominguez b Frankel (1989) is to disentan-
gle the influence of the portfolio- and the expectations
channel. Dominguez and Frankel do not "invoke the methodo-
logy of rational expectations" (p. 9). Instead, they
"measure expectations of the future spot exchange rate by
means of survey data on the forecasts of market partici-
pants" (p.3)'. As we argued in the theoretical part,
sterilized interventions are effective if they are able to
change the risk premium. As the expected exchange rate
change is a crucial component of the risk premium Dominguez
and Frankel try to establish the impact of publicly known
intervention and interventions carried out anonymously on
market partícipants' expectations:
~,., '- S, - oo t~, ( S,., - S, ) f o, NEWS, f~, REPI, f~t, Í 2 3)
where ~,,,' is the log of the k-days-ahead expectation for
the S ~ DM spot rate. It is supposed that investors expect
the trend in exchange rate movements over the previous j
days to carry on during the following k days. Furthermore
investors are expected to redress their expectations when
it becomes known that central banks change their exchange
rate policy. The dummy variable NEWS captures this effect.
The dummy variable REPI is multiplied by the amount of
' This method is open to question because survey data do not
have to correspond with market expectations. Market participants
are interested in masking their actual expectations.
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Intervention REPorted in the newspapers to account for the
effect of discrete interventions. Consistent estimates are
obtained by replacing variables which cause simultaneity by
instrumental variables (IV) that are exogenous but do, at
least partly, explain the endogenous variables. Estimation
results for the period October 1982 - October 1984 are not
very interesting. As is well known the monetary autorities
in the U.S. hardly intervened during that period. For the
period October 1984-December 1987 it appears from the
estimation results that "newspaper reports of prospective
intervention in support of the dollar (...) tend(ed] to
lower expectations of the future ~ ~ DM exchange rate "(p.
18) by 0.005 per cent on average. When measured on the day
before the survey, intervention, expressed as a percent of
wealth (W), is a statistically significant determinant of
the risk premium on DM denominated assets. This leads
Dominguez and Frankel to conclude-that over the period
considered sterilized interventions were effective. In an
attempt to quantify the effects they carry out some tenta-
tive calculations. On the assumption that interest rates in
Germany and the United States are held constant an inter-
vention not known publically has no effect on effect on the
risk premium. The effect on the spot rate is in proportion
to the total reserve money supplied to the banking system
by the Bundesbank. A~ 100 million non-sterilized interven-
tion thus represents an exchange rate change of 0.079 per
cent (in 1987). The change in the spot rate caused by a
sterilized intervention of the same amount is smaller
(because of the larger denoninator that applies here) but
is nonetheless not zero. The calculated exchange rate
effect of a publically known intervention is far greater.
The level of the risk premium on DM assets is affected.
This leads investors to reallocate their portfolios. In the
absence of expectations with an extrapolating character and
induced interest rate changes the exchange rate change
amounts to 2.4 per cent.
In the analysis of Humpage (1988) it is not the volume
of intervention that counts but the mere fact that the
Federal Reserve Bank did intervene. To emphasize the search
for the "news"-effect of interventions Humpage makes a
distinction, with the aid of dummy variables, between
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initial íntervention,which he defines as intervention
carried out followinq a period of at least five days
without intervention on the one hand and subsequent inter-
vention defined as the complement of the former type on the
other hand. F'or the period Auqust 1984-August 1987 Humpage
distinquishes three estimation periods in which the attitu-
de of the Federal Reserve System towards intervention
showed fundamental differences. Initial purchases of DM and
yen directly following the Plaza meeting (represented by
the dummy variables D' and D') significantly contributed to
a depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the DM and the
yen respectively. Subsequent intervention (represented by
the dummy variables D' and D') did not produce a siq-
nificant effect:
S(DM~S), --0.052 D,~ ~0.002 D,, ` f 0.999 S(DM~s),.,
(-6.455) (0.824) (1003.3)
S(Yen~S),- -0.027 D,' -0. 0002 D,., 't 0.999 S(Yen~S),., (25)
(-4.996) (-0.101) (5272.1)
Initial intervention carried out as a consequence of the
Louvre agreement did not have an effect on the opening
rates rates of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the DM (S(DM~~),)
and the Yen (S(Yen~S),) in New York due to conflicting
statements on the direction of U.S. policy. Humpage conclu-
des that intervention can have an effect on exchange rate
movements taking into account that "the size and duration
of any announcement effect seems to depend on the extent to
which the intervention creates expectations of changes in
monetary and fiscal policies" (p. 15).
Eijffinger b Gruijters (1989b) assume the market for
foreign exchange to be highly efficient. For that reason
they relate the closing rate of the U.S, dollar in DM at
the Frankfurt foreign exchange market on day t to the
opening rate of the same day, the lagged closing rate,
changes in the interest differential between one-month
Euro-DM - and Eurodollar deposits in London during day t
and spot market intervention by the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve respectively during day t. Interventions
appear to have ínfluenced the U.S. dollar-DM exchange rate
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significantly during only one out of eight estimated
periods of about six months. U.S. dollar-sales of one
billion DM during the six months just before the establish-
ment of the Plaza agreement on average led the S~DM rate to
drop 0.65 per cent. The announcement of unexpected U.S.
trade balance figures proves to have outweighed the effect
of interventions in other periods. Eijffinger 6 Gruijters
do however find that "a selective intervention strategy and
a careful timing of the interventions" (p.20) can ímprove
the effectiveness. Coordinated interventions and initial
interventions, defined similarly as in Humpage (1988)
appear to have a larger announcement effect.
8.CONCLUSIONS
Given the turbulent developments on the markets for
foreign exchange it takes fine data which give a precise
description of intervention carried out primarily to influ-
ence the spot rate of the currency under review to esta-
blish the objectives a central bank pursued during the
estimation period and to detect the actual effectiveness of
the interventions undertaken. From the more dated as well
as from the more recent studies it appears that countering
I.irqe exrh.rnc~e r-.itr mrivc,mr~nts i:; the most important objec-
tive central banks pursue with their interventions in the
market for foreign exchange. Obviously, the realisation of
a target level of the exchange rate is also a matter of
concern for the central banks. However, because the target
level the central bankers have in mind is not known and
because it evolves over time, relating interventions to it
is not easy.
A careful interpretation of the estimated reaction
functions keeping in mind, as a conditioning factor, the
actual effectiveness of intervention appearing from empiri-
cal studies as well, leads us to doubt about the usefulness
of a very extensive subdivision of objectives as for
example made in the Jurgensen-report. A broad subdivision
with two categories seems reasonable to us: interventions
carried out on account of a leaning against the wind policy
whereby the central banks' sales and purchases are aimed at
dampening exchange rate movements without altering the
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underlying trend on the one hand and interventions underta-
ken to alter the trend in the development of the exchange
rate because it is moving out of line with the 'fundamen-
tals' or for economic or political reasons on the other
hand.
The effectiveness of the first category of interven-
tions is fairly neqligible whereas interventions of the
second cateqory if embodying a sufficient 'news'-content
appear to have a larger chance of affecting the exchange
rate significantly. Several attempts have been made to
detect the components of which the announcement effect is
made up. In this context the extra-effectiveness of inter-
vention carried out after a certain period of no interven-
tion and coordinated intervention is investigated. The
results are rather mixed indicating perhaps that whether or
not market participants pay attention to the interventions
also depends on the availability of other 'news'. State-
ments of politicians and monetary authorities which accom-
pany the intervention can lend support to or detract from
its effectiveness. Influencing the exchange rate by means
of intervention must run by the expectations channel. With
that it can be ascertained that interventions do not
constitute an independent tool of monetary policy.
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